In the everyday democratic political movement, there is a conflict between those who act in the name of equality (and those who are in solidarity with them) and the social order that implies their inequality. This conflict calls Ranciére a disagreement (a disagreement), a term he uses to call his most complete political book. He defines a disagreement: “We should describe the disagreement of a certain type of discourse situation: a situation where one of the interlocutors immediately understands and does not understand what the other is saying” (D x). A little later, he writes: If the political subject is a subject of injustice, if politics exists only by subjectivation of falsehood, how can we avoid a sacrificial identification of the political subject to this injustice? If political subjectivity can only exist to the extent that falsehood exists, how can we avoid considering the false as the cause of the subject and thus making the political subject a victim? Indeed, it would be difficult to avoid the victimization of political subjectivity if we assumed that injustice precedes and simply determines the existence of the political subject. This would indeed mean the equivalent of the search for the ark of politics (in this case political philosophy should establish a victimological arch) which, as we have seen, is forbidden by Ranciére`s conceptualization of the “principle” of equality. But, as the Slovenian philosopher and translator of Ranciére`s work, Jelica Sumic-Riha, pointed out, 8 things are more complicated. Indeed, if the policy, which begins with a declaration of injustice, is done only within the framework of the order of the police and if, by definition, the order of the police is the order of the absence of injustice, then evil cannot simply precede its statement. Injustice does not simply precede the emergence of the political subject, the theme of injustice. It follows that with the explanation of injustice in the context of the police order, it is not only the political subject that appears, but the injustice itself. The explanation of injustice is therefore never merely a statement on a pre-existing fact.
Politics did not contradict the facts by other facts. The existence of an injustice is not a fact. Rather, the explanation of an injustice is a break with the logic of the facts. The realization of injustice is absolutely impossible, for the existence of injustice is not before its statement. But that is an explanation that happens. This involves a debate that retroactively changes the conditions of its own possibility. The imposition of political subjectivity by the declaration of an injustice therefore implies a kind of anarchic, free gesture, which is self-authorized by a retroactive condition of the existence of the conditions of its own possibility. That is why, as Ranciére tells us, politics is always primarily a disagreement over the existence of politics.
A democratic policy is a matter of confrontation with disagreement. The term used by Ranciére for this confrontation is false. It`s a disagreement. Disagreement does not or does not primarily concern competing views on a subject, for example. B the under-remuneration of a group of workers. It is a question of who learns speech, who counts the voice. And more profoundly, it`s about who actually has a voice, who is able to speak. Workers` demands, women`s demands, claims of those marginalized by race, class, immigration status, etc., are not recognized as claims because they are not recognized as expenses of people capable of making real demands. Rancier`s political philosophy is characterized by a series of key concepts: politics, disagreements, police, equality, post-democracy. This is an unusual way of defining a disagreement in general and a particular political disagreement, and what we should unpack, what Ranciére means by that.